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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
Corporate accounting scandal is not a new phenomenon and it is the 
outcome of corporate accruals i.e., accruals by management choice. 
This study investigated the use of corporate accruals  in the financial 
statements of the listed companies in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
through segregating total accruals into corporate (discretionary) and 
accounting (non-discretionary) accruals. The average rate of corporate 
accruals was 35 percent and in many cases, cash flow from operation 
exceeded the net income, the growth in accounts receivable was faster 
than sales growth, and inventory growth was not consistent with sales 
growth. In this context, this study may create awareness of the risk 
factors of corporate accruals among external users’ of accounting 
information especially analysts, regulator, policy makers, existing and 
potential shareholders, lenders, trade creditors, external auditors, 
researchers, financial advisors, and stock brokers. Consequently, it 
may reduce the use of management discretion in preparing the 
financial statements.       
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate swindle has subjugated the financial news in recent years. The scandal at Waste Management 
(1998), Enron Corporation (2001), Tyco International (2002), WorldCom (2002), Health-South (2003), 
Freddil Mac (2003), American International Group (2005), Lehman Brothers (2008), Bernie Madoff 
(2008), and Satyam (2009) to name but a few, emphasizing the will and ability of unscrupulous 
managers to defraud investors and other stakeholders. These scandals call into the question of reliability 
of reported earnings. The recent wave of corporate governance failures has raised concerns about the 
integrity of the accounting information provided to investors and resulted in a drop in investor 
confidence (Jain et al, 2003; Rezaee 2004; Jain & Rezaee 2006). These failures were highly exposed 
and ultimately led to the drop of investors’ confidence on accounting information. In Bangladesh, 
investors’ do not have strong confidence on information provided in annual report (Razzaque 2004). 
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The recent wave of corporate scandals in the United States and elsewhere has dramatized, once again, 
the severity of the agency problems that may arise between managers and shareholders (Joseph et al, 
2004). A principal concern of many users of financial statements has been whether or not earnings are 
overstated. Companies may be motivated to increase earnings in a particular period to meet analysts’ 
earnings expectations, to meet debt covenants, or to improve incentive compensation. Importantly, 
management also may have incentives to lower reported earnings in a particular period.  
In the United States, the SEC study (2002), Report Pursuant in Section 704 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, reviews 515 enforcement actions between July 31, 1997 and July 30, 2002. The study classified 
improper accounting practices into four categories: (i) Improper revenue recognition (126 cases) 
including reporting revenue in advance through techniques, such as holding the accounting period open, 
billing without shipping (bill and hold), fictitious revenue, and improper valuation of revenue; (ii) 
Improper expenses recognition (101cases) including improper capitalization, overstating inventory, 
understating bad debts/loan losses, improper use of restructuring reserves, and failure to record asset 
impairments; (iii) Improper accounting in connection with business combination (23 cases); and, (iv) 
Other accounting and reporting issues (130 cases) including inadequate disclosures, failure to disclose 
related party transactions, inappropriate accounting for non-monetary and round-trip transactions, 
improper accounting for foreign payments in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, improper 
use of off-balance sheet arrangements, and improper use of non-GAAP financial measures (CFA:2011).  
In Bangladesh, the stock market had been crashed twice- one in 1996 and the other in 2010-2011. In 
1996, the cause of crash was speculative bubble and in 2010-2011 the cause was asset pricing bubble. 
In  DSE it is observed that, the stock price moves up if the earning per share is higher than that of the 
same quarter of the previous year. It is an indication of earnings manipulation in order to move up the 
price or better performance of their stock in the capital market. A probe committee was formed by the 
government to find out the real causes behind the crash of the capital market in 2010-2011. The probe 
committee digs out various ways to manipulate the capital market. Among those ways, accounting 
manipulation was important one which is somewhat responsible for creating asset pricing bubble in the 
capital market (Probe Committee Report: 2011).  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) provided their opinion and 
recommendations to the probe committee in 2011. Quality of financial statements of the issuers was one 
of the concerned issues. Major areas of concern were as follows: 
• Quality of earnings  
• Non-compliance of accounting standards 
• Revaluation of fixed assets 
• Poor quality of work of some audit firms that are in the SEC panel of auditors 
During investigation, Probe Committee (2011) observed that companies were overstating their assets in 
the name of revaluation as there was a weakness of the revaluation process in Bangladesh and deferred 
tax implications were not properly accounted in the financial statement. Even, many companies had 
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issued bonus shares against such unrealized gains which were not legal. The probe committee provides 
the following information to observe the scenario of the revaluation of assets.  
 
Table 1: Test Case of Overvaluation of Assets 
 
Name 
NAV per share in Taka 
Before 
revaluation 
After 
revaluation 
% 
change 
Libra Infusions 438 15667 3472 
Sonali Aansh Industries 297 2156 626 
Rahim Textile 127 785 518 
BD Thai Aluminum 142 566 298 
Orion Infusion Ltd 20 101 413 
Ocean Containers Ltd. 13 50 296 
Shine Pukur Ceramic 12 26 120 
Eastern Insurance 151 309 104 
     Source: Probe Committee Report, 2011; NAV = Net Assets Value 
Earnings per share (EPS) is an important indicator to justify the share price of a company. In Bangladesh, 
earnings per share of companies are manipulated in order to hike the offer price in the stock market. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) mentioned the manipulating strategies as 
follows:  
1. Annualizing EPS computation – There were instances where issuers annualized the latest quarterly 
or semi-annual EPS without using latest available full year EPS. Such quarterly/semi annually EPS 
figures were significantly higher than historical EPS which is most likely to be “managed” 
2. Manipulation related to weighted average number of shares in computing EPS- There were instances 
where issuers had issued a large number of shares closer to the balance sheet date so that such new 
shares would have lesser impact in computing weighted average number of shares. 
3. Issue of shares subsequent to the balance sheet date – There were instances where new shares issued 
subsequent to the balance sheet date and impact of such new shares were not taken into account in 
computing EPS in pricing the IPO. 
4. Inclusion of exceptional non-recurring income into the EPS computation (example: capital gains). 
(Source: Probe Committee Report, 2011) 
Management has a unique ability to commit fraud because it often is in a position to directly or indirectly 
manipulate accounting records and present deceitful financial information. Fraudulent financial 
reporting often involves management override of controls that otherwise may appear to be operating 
effectively. Management can either direct employees to perpetrate fraud or solicit help in carrying it out. 
In addition, management personnel as a component of the entity may be in a position to manipulate the 
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accounting records of the component in a manner that causes a material misstatement in the consolidated 
financial statements of the entity. Management override of controls can occur in unpredictable ways 
(CFA: 2011).  
In view of the above facts, it is clear that agency issues is a severe problem in the corporate world of 
Bangladesh and there is a great possibility of using discretionary accruals (choice by management) in 
the financial statements to achieve desired goals. Discretionary accrual is an important economic 
variable to assess the quality of earnings. The quality of earnings is directly related with the quality of 
accruals. Higher discretionary accruals indicate lower quality of earnings and lower discretionary 
accruals indicate higher quality of earnings. In this context, the main objective of this study is to examine 
whether there is an existence of discretionary accruals in the corporate financial statements in 
Bangladesh and if so, assess the level of discretionary accruals. The secondary objectives are to find out 
some evidences that could lead to accounting irregularities and to refer the risk factors associated with 
the fraud triangle and common accounting warning signs.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2: presents literature review, section 3: 
describes various accruals models, section 4: empirical methodology, section 5: discussion of results 
and section 6: conclusion.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Accrual manipulation is an important way to managers to produce a desired earnings number. The 
company does not change its activities but, rather, opportunistically reports income for an existing 
activity. Accruals create the opportunity for earnings management because they require managers to 
make forecasts, estimates, and judgments. The greater the degree of discretion in an accrual, the greater 
the opportunity for earnings management (Dechow & Schrand, 2004). Generally, managers prefer the 
manipulation of accruals over the manipulation of real activities. Consequently, managers are likely to 
resort to the manipulation of real activities only when there is limited scope left for accrual manipulation. 
The manipulation of both accruals and real activities has severe consequences on the reliability of 
earnings for decision making. Managerial manipulation reduces the reliability of accounting numbers, 
leading to reduced conditional conservatism (Juan et al. 2009). The articulation between the income 
statement and the balance sheet ensures that accruals reflected in earnings also are reflected in net assets. 
Therefore, an optimistic bias in earnings implies net assets measured and recorded temporarily at values 
exceeding those based on a neutral application of GAAP.  Generous assumptions of managers’ about 
recognition and measurement in one period reduce their ability to make equally generous assumptions 
in later periods, if managers want to stay within the guidance provided by accounting regulators and 
professional groups. Therefore, managers’ ability to optimistically bias earnings decreases with the 
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extent to which net assets are already overstated (Barton  & Simko, 2002). Discretionary accruals are 
accounting adjustments to cash flows that managers can choose within the flexibility of GAAP. Since 
GAAP allows certain discretion over financial reporting, there is a possibility that accruals contain 
management’s intention to manipulate information (Beneish 1997; Dechow & Skinner 2000). Previous 
studies detected earnings management behavior through various methods including the changing of 
accounting policies (Balsam et al., 1998), discretionary accruals (Jones 1991), real transactions (Barber 
et al. 1991; Bushee 1998; Cheng 2005), and earnings distribution (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Since 
the middle of 1980s, discretionary accruals have become the primarily focus on detecting earnings 
management. There are two main reasons. Firstly, accrual is a generally accepted accounting principle. 
Accruals are used to reduce inconsistencies encountered as a result of difference in timing of the 
recognition (Dechow & Skinner 2000). Secondly, the accrual technique is less visible and hard to detect 
compare to the changing of accounting policies or real transactions. As such, accruals open a door for 
opportunistic earnings management within the requirement of GAAP. Managers believe that accrual 
technique is a desirable vehicle to achieve their objectives (Dechow 1994; Beneish 2001). 
The accrual method began with Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986), who used total accruals and changes 
in total accruals as a proxy for discretionary accruals respectively. These models capture either income-
increasing or income-reducing techniques that managers have incentives to employ, however, they 
misclassified all accruals as discretionary which lead to biased test if earnings management stimulus is 
correlated to non-discretionary accruals to overcome this limitation. Jones (1991) introduced a linear 
regression approach to control non-discretionary determinants of accruals. She used change in sales 
control for non-discretionary accruals of current assets and liabilities; property, plant and equipment 
control for the non-discretionary component of depreciation expense. The rationale is that a firm’s 
working capital requirements depend on sales, while its depreciation accruals depend on the level of 
property, plant and equipment. Then, she uses the residual for regression of total accruals on non-
discretionary determinants of accruals as discretionary accrual proxy. However, this model misclassified 
all revenue as non-discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) introduced a Modified Jones Model, 
they adjusted the Jones model by removing credit sales from revenues. However, the modified Jones 
Model could still yield biased results if no earnings management occurs in credit sales. In the literature, 
both Jones Model and Modified Jones Model have been widely used in estimating discretionary accruals 
the proxy for earnings management. Since earnings management is not observable, the validity and 
reliability of Jones and Modified Jones empirical models have been often criticized (Bernard & Skinner 
1996; Wilson 1996; Guay et al. 1996; Beneish 1997; Healy & Wahlen 1999; Thomas & Zhang 2000; 
Peasnell et al. 2000; Xie 2001; Leuz et al. 2003). Researchers argued that model misspecification 
problem at least reduces the power of detecting earnings management, and at worst causes researchers 
to conclude that there is earnings management when none actually exist (e.g., McNichols & Wilson 
1988; Dechow et al. 1995). Moreover, it is more likely to detect income increasing earnings management 
for higher profitable firms and income –decreasing earnings management for lower profitable firms. 
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Likewise, researchers are more likely to detect income-increasing earnings management for lower cash 
flow firms and income –decreasing earnings management for higher cash flow firms. Accruals are 
correlated with a firm’s contemporaneous and past performance. Jones and Modified Jones models 
attempt to control for contemporaneous performance but ignore the past performance. Empirical 
assessments suggest that estimated discretionary accruals are significantly influenced by a firm’s 
contemporaneous and past performance. If a firm experiences an unusual performance, for example, has 
one-time extreme high or low sales; or a fast growth stock exhibit momentum for a period of time, then 
there is a danger of a false detection of earnings management unless discretionary accruals models can 
adequately filter out the component that affected by firm performance (Kothari et al. 2005).  
So far a few studies on discretionary accruals might have yet been conducted in Bangladesh. The 
researcher found only one study entitled ‘Earnings Management: An Analysis on Textile Sector of 
Bangladesh’ (Razzaque et al., 2006). The study was conducted long back (period 1992-2002) using the 
Modified Jones Model (1995) and confined to the textile industry only.  The study did not provide any 
information about the level of discretionary accruals. Besides, the study did not use separate models for 
non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. They define discretionary accruals as residuals of total 
accruals model.   
In light of the above, the researchers feel that an in-depth study is urgently needed to measure the level 
of discretionary accruals in the corporate financial statements in Bangladesh so as to find out the clues 
that could lead to accounting irregularities. The researchers also feel that the external stakeholders 
should be acquainted with the risk factors for each condition of the fraud triangle and common 
accounting warning signs that may lead to reduce the use of management discretion in preparing 
financial statement.  
 
3. MODELS OF NON-DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS (ACCOUNTING ACCRUALS) 
 
 
A wide variety of non-discretionary accrual models have been employed by previous researchers. 
Estimating the non-discretionary component of accruals typically involves a regression model.  We 
termed non-discretionary accruals as accounting accruals and discretionary accruals as corporate 
accruals in the study. The common variants of the most popular models are discussed below: 
 
3.1 The Jones Model (1991) 
 
Jones offers a new and potentially more effective way to estimate non-discretionary accruals in her 
model. She uses a property, plant and equipment variable (PPE) to control for any changes in non-
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discretionary accruals arising from the depreciation charge and hence resulting from changes in business 
activities of the firm. Using the same idea, a sales revenue variable is used to control changes in non-
discretionary accruals related to working capital accounts arising from changes in the economic 
environment of the firm. However, revenues, according to Jones, are not completely exogenous; for 
example, shipments for merchandise could be postponed in order to postpone recognition of revenue 
until the next year. The regression is estimated for each sample firm as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
 =  𝛽𝛽1 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+ 𝛽𝛽2 �
∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� +  𝛽𝛽3 �
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝜀𝜀 
Where:  
TA  =  Total Accruals   
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
PPE      =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
LTA     =  Lagged Total Assets 
All variables in her model are scaled by lagged assets to reduce heteroscedasticity.  Discretionary 
accruals (DA), as shown below are computed as the difference between total accruals and non-
discretionary components of accruals. 
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 =  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 −   [ 𝛽𝛽1
�
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� + 𝛽𝛽2 �
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𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� +  𝛽𝛽3 �
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
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�] 
Looking at the Jones model, it is clear that the idea of using two variables (∆ REV and ∆ PPE) to control 
for changes in non-discretionary accruals makes this model potentially more accurate for an analysis of 
earnings manipulations. However, the assumption that coefficient estimates are stationary over time 
would create survivorship bias. As well, sales manipulation that can be managed by managers is 
completely ignored since this model assumes that all revenues in the period are non-discretionary.  
 
3.2 The Modified Jones Model (1995) 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) modify the original Jones model to eliminate the conjectured tendency to measure 
discretionary accruals with error when discretion is exercised over revenues. The change in revenues is 
adjusted for the change in receivables in the event period. They assume that all changes in credit sales 
in the event period proceed from earnings management. They conclude that managing earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales is easier than managing earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. The regression for the sample is 
estimated as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
 =  𝛽𝛽1 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� + 𝛽𝛽2 �
∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 −  ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝛽𝛽3 � 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+   𝜀𝜀 
Where:  
TA  =  Total Accruals 
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∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR    =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE      =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
LTA     =  Lagged Total Assets 
Discretionary accruals (DA), as shown below, are computed as the difference between total accruals and 
the non-discretionary components of accruals. 
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 = �
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
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� +  𝛽𝛽3 �
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�] 
 
3.3. The Extended Jones Cash Flow Model (1999) 
 
Kasznik (1999) adds to modified Jones model changes in operating cash flow as an explanatory variable 
to explain the negative correlation between cash flow from operations and total accruals. He finds that 
managers use income-increasing discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings toward their 
forecast numbers when they have overestimated earnings. In contrast, he finds no evidence that 
managers use income-decreasing discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings downward when 
they have underestimated earnings in their forecasts. The regression for the sample is estimated as 
follows: 
�
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�  =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 �
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𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝛼𝛼3 � 
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𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+ 𝜀𝜀 
Where:  
NDA  =  Non-Discretionary Accruals 
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR    =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE      =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
∆CFO = Change in cash flows from operation 
LTA     =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
3.4 Modified Jones Model with Book-to-Market Ratio and Cash Flows (2004) 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) add the book-to-market ratio (BM) and operating cash flows (CFO) to 
modified Jones model to mitigate measurement error associated with the discretionary accruals.  BM 
controls for expected growth in operations and if left uncontrolled, growth will be picked up as 
discretionary accruals. CFO controls for current operating performance. Controlling for performance is 
important because Dechow et al. (1995) find that discretionary accruals are likely to be misspecified for 
firms with extreme levels of performance. Larcker and Richardson (2004) note that their model is 
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superior to the modified Jones model in several ways: it has far greater explanatory power, identifies 
unexpected accruals that are less persistent than other components of earnings, the estimated 
discretionary accruals detect earnings management identified in SEC enforcement actions, and identifies 
discretionary accruals that are associated with lower future earnings and lower future stock returns. The 
regression for the sample is estimated as follows: 
�
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Where:  
TA  =  Total Accruals 
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR    =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE      =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
BM =  Book-to-Market Ratio 
CFO =  Cash Flows from Operations 
LTA     =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
3.5 The Performance Matching Model (2005) 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), develop a performance-matching model. They offer two different 
approaches. The first involves matching similar firms, which alleviates the need to use an ordinary least 
square estimate of DA. They detect earnings management by comparing the accruals of firms that are 
otherwise almost identical. The second, the linear-performance matching model, embodies two 
modifications of the Jones and modified Jones models: an intercept, and an additional control for lagged 
rate of return on assets, ROAt-1.  
Because the first term in the Jones model is the reciprocal of lagged assets, econometrically, the Jones 
model does not have an intercept. Deflating by lagged assets is meant to mitigate heteroscedasticity. 
Finding that heteroscedasticity is still an issue, Kothari, Leone, and Wasley also include an intercept to 
mitigate it. They find that an intercept yields higher symmetry around zero discretionary accruals, which 
enhances the power of test for type 1 error. 
Roodposhti, Rezaei and Salehi (2012) named this model as Kothari-Jones and Modified Kothari-Jones 
models and the regression for the sample is estimated as follows:   
 
3.5.1 Kothari-Jones Model 
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Where:  
NDA =  Non-Discretionary Accruals 
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
PPE       =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
ROA t-1 = Lagged Rate of Return on Assets 
LTA      =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
3.5.2 Modified Kothari-Jones Model 
 
�
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�  =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+ 𝛼𝛼2 �
∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 −  ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� +  𝛼𝛼3 � 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝛼𝛼4 [𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝜀 
Where:  
NDA  =  Non-Discretionary Accruals 
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR     =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE       =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
ROAt-1 = Lagged Rate of Return on Assets 
LTA      =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
3.6 Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model  
 
Cash flow is an important basis for accrual measurement (Ingram & Lee 2007). There is considerable 
body of literature that defines total accruals as the difference between net income and cash flow from 
operating activities (Dechow, Solan & Sweeny 1995; Xie Davidson & DaDalt 2003). This traditional 
approach has been extended by Dechow and Ge (2006) who define total accruals as the difference 
between earnings and free cash flow. Recent research studies have used the free cash flow approach to 
accruals measurement (Bukit & Iskandar 2009). Free cash flow (FCF) is the combination of cash flow 
from operating activities and investing activities, which reflects the impact of cash spending on fixed 
assets and investments. Companies operating with high FCF provide greater opportunities for 
opportunistic behavior by management. Therefore, it is appropriate to suggest that FCF better reflects 
accruals for individual firms (Bhuiyan et al. 2013).  
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𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 = �
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� −  [ 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+ 𝛼𝛼2 �
∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 −  ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� + 𝛼𝛼3 � 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+ 𝛼𝛼4 [𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝜀] 
Where:  
TA       = Total Accruals ( Net Income before extraordinary items less free cash flow from 
           operating activities and cash flow from investing activities) 
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR     =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE       =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
ROAt-1 = Lagged Rate of Return on Assets 
LTA      =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1 Data and sample description 
 
As on June 30, 2012 total listed securities of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) were 511, of which 273 
were securities (3 corporate bonds, 8 debentures, 41 mutual funds, & 221 treasury bonds) and 238 were 
companies.  Again, 30 companies were banks, 22 were financial institutions and 45 were insurance 
companies out of 238 listed companies. Annual reports of 68 listed companies of 2010-2011 out of 141 
listed non financial companies were taken as sample in the current study. The relevant data were 
collected through the survey of financial statements of annual report for the year 2010-2011 of each firm 
of the sample companies. The relevant pages of the annual report were statement of income (for revenue, 
net income), statement of cash flow (cash flow from operation), statement of financial position (for 
accounts receivable, total assets), and schedule of fixed assets (for gross value of fixed assets).   
4.2 Measurement of accounting accruals manipulation 
Earnings management is predominantly a function of manipulating accruals, so it is intuitive to use the 
magnitude of accruals as a proxy for earnings quality: the higher the total accruals as a percentage of 
assets, the greater the likelihood that earnings quality is low. The size of accruals can be used as a rough 
measure for earnings manipulation, especially in high-accrual firms (Tim Keefe: 2013). Three steps are 
involved in deriving discretionary accruals i.e., Step-1: Total accruals, Step-2: Accounting accruals 
(Non-discretionary accruals) and Step-3: Corporate accruals (Discretionary accruals).    
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4.2.1 Measuring the Total Accruals 
There are two ways to measure the total accruals created in a given period (Tim Keefe: 2013). 
1. The Balance Sheet Approach 
2. The Statement of Cash Flow Approach 
4.2.1.1 The Balance Sheet Approach 
Using the balance sheet, we can find the total net accruals by subtracting: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 −  𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 
But the balance sheet doesn’t directly tell us what accrual earnings or cash earnings were in the period, 
so we will have to perform further calculation to retrieve this information. 
4.2.1.1.1  Accrual Earnings 
Net income flows into the balance sheet as retained earnings, which can be found in the owners’ equity 
section of the balance sheet. Owners’ equity also reflects net distributions to equity holders, and we will 
need to make some adjustments for these items. So, owners’ equity at the end of the period will be as 
under: 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 = 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 + 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 − 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 − 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴
+ 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 
To calculate accrual earnings, we can rearrange the equation above and find that it is the difference 
between ending owners’ equity and beginning owners’ equity, adjusted for dividends, stock repurchases 
and stock issuances. This adjustment can be summarized as net cash distribution to equity. 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 =  ∆ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸+ 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒
=  ∆ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸+ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 
Now, assuming that Assets – Liabilities = Owners’ Equity, we can substitute to get the following 
equation for accrual earnings: 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 =  ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 −  ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 + 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 ∗ 
∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 = 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 
4.2.1.1.2  Cash Earnings 
To begin, cash earnings must be somehow related to the cash account and can be found by looking at 
the change in the cash account. The cash account is also affected by net cash distributions to equity 
holders, and we will need to make some adjustments for these items. So, cash earnings at the end of the 
period will be as under: 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 =  ∆ 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ + 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒       
=  ∆ 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ + 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 
Total Accruals 
The section began with the basic total net accruals equation and then went to define accrual earnings 
and cash earnings. Now with these definitions in hand we can substitute them in. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 − 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 
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= [∆ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 − ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 + 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ∗] −  [∆ 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ + 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 ∗] 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 −  ∆ 𝐿𝐿𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 −  ∆ 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 
 
∗ 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 = 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 
 
4.2.1.2 The Statement of Cash Flow Approach 
Using the statement of cash flow, we can find total accruals with the same basic equation as stated 
before: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 −  𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 
4.2.1.2.1 Accrual Earnings 
Calculating total accruals from the statement of cash flow is a bit more straightforward. This is because 
we don’t need to pull out accrual earnings, because net income is stated right on the report.  
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒 (𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼) 
4.2.1.2.2 Cash Earnings 
Cash earnings can be found from statement of cash flow. Cash flow from operating activities is treated 
as cash earnings.  
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 
Total Accruals 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 −  𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴  
                                                  = 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
In this study, due to non-articulation issues, the cash flow approach has been used to measure total 
accruals for each of sample companies by following equation: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� = � 
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� [𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶]  
Where, 
TA =  Total Accruals  
NI =  Net Income for the current period 
CFO =  Cash Flow from Operations for the current period 
LTA =  Lagged Total Assets [Total assets of the last year] 
*Both items in the equation are scaled by lagged total assets in order to reduce heteroscedasticity. 
 
4.2.2  Measuring Accounting Accruals (Non-Discretionary Accruals) 
Using the raw accrual amounts as a proxy for earnings management is a simple method to evaluate 
earnings quality because firms can have high accruals for legitimate business reasons, such as sales 
growth. A more complicated proxy can be created by attempting to categorize total accruals into 
accounting accruals and corporate accruals. The accounting accruals component reflects business 
conditions such as growth and the length of the operating cycle that naturally create and destroy accruals, 
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while the corporate accruals component identifies management choices. The following two steps are 
involved in measuring accounting accruals.   
 
4.2.2.1 Measuring Co-efficient Estimates by using Regression Model 
The following regression model for the sample has been developed in light of the modified Kothari-
Jones Model (2005) as to eliminate possible mechanical relationship between performance metric and 
current period’s corporate accrual estimate in order to measure the coefficient estimates (ß value) that 
are used to segregate the accruals into accounting accruals and corporate accruals components. The 
regression model for total accruals for the sample firm is estimated as follows: 
�
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�  =  𝛽𝛽1 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+ 𝛽𝛽2 �
∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 −  ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� +  𝛽𝛽3 �
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝛽𝛽4 �
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝜀𝜀 
 Where:  
TA  =  NI – CFO, where NI (net income) is taken from the statement of income    
                   and CFO (operating cash flows) is taken from the statement of cash flows.  
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR    =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE      =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
NI        =  Net Income 
LTA     =  Lagged Total Assets 
Each ß is the estimated relationship of the independent variable to the dependent variable, and the error 
term represents the composite effect of all variables not explicitly stated as an independent variable. 
 
4.2.2.2 Measuring firm’s accounting accruals by using regression Equation 
The above coefficient estimates (ß value) are used in the following regression equation to estimate the 
firm-specific normal accruals (NA) or non-discretionary accruals for our sample firms: 
�
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�  =  𝛽𝛽1 �
1
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� + 𝛽𝛽2 �
∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 −  ∆ 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝛽𝛽3 � 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�+  𝛽𝛽4 �
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� 
Where:  
AA  =  Accounting (Non-Discretionary) Accruals 
∆ REV  =  Change in Revenues from the preceding year 
∆ AR     =  Change in Accounts Receivable from the preceding year 
PPE       =  Gross Value of Property , Plant & Equipment 
NI =  Net Income 
LTA      =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
 
 
 
PAGE 26| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2014, VOL. 1, Series. 1 
 
4.2.3 Measuring Corporate Accruals (Discretionary Accruals) 
The value of total accruals and accounting accruals are available at this stage and corporate accruals is 
the difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals, defined as  
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = �
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� −  �
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
� 
Where, 
 CA  =  Corporate (Discretionary) Accruals 
 TA  =  Total Accruals 
 AA  =  Accounting (Non-discretionary) Accruals 
 LTA  =  Lagged Total Assets 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The statistical results of our analysis captured the existence of discretionary accruals in the financial 
statements of listed companies in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) of Bangladesh. The practicing average 
rate of discretionary accruals of listed non-financial companies is 35 percent in Bangladesh (Annex-1). 
Table 1 shown below reveals that 12 percent of non-financial listed companies scored 0 to 10 percent 
(of either sign), 22 percent scored 11 to 20 percent, 16 percent companies scored 21 to 30 percent, 21 
percent companies scored 31 to 40 percent, 15 percent companies scored 41 to 50 percent, 7 percent 
companies scored 51 to 60 percent and 7 percent scored more than 61 percent. Companies with large 
accruals tend to have large estimation errors. The diligence of earnings is lower when earnings consists 
mainly accruals. When accruals are large in magnitude, they are likely to contain significant estimation 
error, which reduces the diligence of earnings. Managers often want earnings to be highly persistent and 
predictable because these characteristics can improve their reputations with analysts and investors. If 
such earnings do not annuitize the intrinsic value of the firm, however, the earnings are low quality. 
Under accrual accounting, current experience is used to make accounting estimates for future periods 
and these estimates feed back into current- period earnings (Dechow & Schrand; 2004).   
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Table 2 :Distribution of Corporate Accruals 
Class interval of 
discretionary 
accruals, (%) 
Frequency  
(No of companies) 
No of companies (%) 
<      10 8 12% 
11 – 20 15 22% 
21 – 30 11 16% 
31 – 40 14 21% 
41 – 50 10 15% 
51 – 60 5 7% 
61      < 5 7% 
  68 100% 
 
The quality of accruals can vary among companies as a function of accruals even in the absence of 
intentional earnings manipulation. The determination of earnings requires estimations and judgments 
and some companies require more forecasts and estimates than others. For example, companies in 
growing industries will typically have high accruals, which raises a question about reliability because 
accruals are likely to contain estimation errors. Estimation errors reduce earnings persistence (because 
they must be corrected in future earnings) and are irrelevant for valuation. Therefore, large accruals (of 
either sign) can indicate great underlying volatility in the company’s operations and low-quality 
earnings. Accrual accounting opens the door to opportunistic short-run income smoothing that can lead 
to future restatements and write-downs. In this method, the company does not change its activities but, 
rather, opportunistically reports income for an existing activity. Examples, increase in income is 
reducing the allowance for doubtful accounts, capitalizing rather than expensing costs, and avoiding 
write-offs of assets. Accruals create the opportunity for earnings management because they require 
managers to make forecasts, estimates, and judgments.  Many studies found that high accruals, in 
absolute magnitude, are a potential “red flag” that indicates companies are engaged in earnings 
management. In absolute magnitude, the result shows that the average rate of practicing discretionary 
accruals of listed non-financial companies in Bangladesh is 37 percent (Annex-1).  Table 2 reveals that 
26 percent of sample companies scored 0 to 10 percent, 24 percent of sample companies scored 11 to 
20 percent, 13 percent of sample companies scored 21 to 30 percent, 18 percent of sample companies 
scored 31 to 40 percent, 7 percent of sample companies scored 41 to 50 percent, 7 percent of sample 
companies scored 51 to 60 percent and 5 percent of sample companies scored more than 61 percent 
respectively. Thus, on the whole, 74 percent of the sample companies scored more than 10 percent, 
which is clearly a ‘red flag’ for all the stakeholders both internal and external. It is also evident that 
management is abusing their discretionary power through manipulating accounting accruals.  As a result, 
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the level of confidence of the external stakeholders on corporate financial reporting is still too low like 
earlier studies.  
Karim (1998) found that financial reporting in developing countries is generally characterized by lack 
of transparency, adequacy, reliability and timeliness. Ahmed (1982) found that the image and reliability 
of financial statements prepared by Bangladeshi companies are not up to international standard and in 
most cases those are dressed up and cosmetics. What they reveal is interesting but what they conceal is 
vital. That’s why nobody has confidence on those financial statements and hardly anybody uses them 
for making economic decisions. Rahman (1982) also found that there is no truth in accounting. 
Accounting is what one wants it to be. Rahman (1982) found that multinational enterprises understate 
profits through the manipulations of accounting policies. Razzaque (2004) and Hasan (2013) found the 
same poor level of confidence of the stakeholders on corporate financial reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Corporate Accruals* 
Class interval of 
discretionary 
accruals, (%) 
Frequency 
(No of companies) 
No of companies (%) 
<    10 18 26% 
11 – 20 16 24% 
21 – 30 9 13% 
31 – 40 12 18% 
41 – 50 5 7% 
51 – 60 5 7% 
61    < 3 5% 
  68 100% 
          *Absolute Value 
 
In many cases, it is observed that cash flow from operation exceeds net income (Annex -2) like Enron’s 
case, the growth rate of accounts receivable is faster than sales growth (Annex-3), the growth of 
inventory is not consistent with sales growth (Annex-4) and it could lead accounting irregularities. 
Therefore, it can be said that the external users including analysts of accounting information in 
Bangladesh are not aware about the risk factors of three conditions of fraud triangle and common 
accounting warning signs. 
Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) No.99 warns practitioners to be alert for the ‘fraud triangle’ or 
three conditions that are generally present when fraud occurs: 
• Incentives or pressures exist that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting, such as pressure to 
meet debt covenants or analysts’ earnings expectations. 
• Opportunities to commit fraud exist, such as poor internal control. 
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• The individuals themselves are able to rationalize their behavior, such as a desire to get the 
company through a difficult time, after which they plan to undo their accounting games. 
SAS-99 provides examples of fraud risk factors for each of the conditions of the fraud triangle 
(Annexure-5). Based on the SEC, USA studies (2002) and a review of accounting scandals, several 
common accounting warning signs are apparent (Annex–6).  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The study focuses on the existence of discretionary accruals in the corporate financial statements 
published in the annual report of non-financial companies listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange of 
Bangladesh. There are two different approaches to measure total accruals e.g., The Balance Sheet 
Approach and Statement of Cash Flow Approach. In this study, due to non-articulation issues, Statement 
of Cash Flow Approach is used to find out the total accruals for each of the sample companies. Total 
accruals are scaled by lagged total assets in order to reduce heteroscedasticity.  
The division of total accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary accruals (accruals by management 
choice) is an important area in accounting research. A wide variety of models have been employed by 
researchers such as The Jones Model, The Modified Jones Model, The Extended Jones Cash Flow 
Model, The Performance Matching Model (The Kothari-Jones Model and The Modified Kothari-Jones 
Model), and  The Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. The detailed discussions of these 
models have been presented earlier in the later part of literature review section of this study. The 
performance matched regression model is used for measuring the degree of influence of four 
independent variables (co-efficient estimates i.e., ß value) over total accruals (dependent variable). Non-
discretionary accruals are predicted by using a linear regression equation. The discretionary accrual is 
the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The study found discretionary 
accruals (accruals by management choice) is practiced by all the sample companies. The average 
practicing rate of discretionary accruals is 35 percent. The external users of accounting information of 
public limited companies are not aware of the risk factors of three conditions of fraud triangle and 
common accounting warning signs as in some cases it is observed that cash flow from operation 
exceeded the net income like Enron’s case, the growth rate of accounts receivable is faster than sales 
growth, and the growth of inventory is not consistent with sales growth.  
The existence of these red flags (the risk factors) and accounting warning signs does not mean that the 
company is engaged in accounting fraud. The analysts should take care while performing the evaluation 
of corporate financial statements with multiple red flags.  If too many red flags exist, it is undoubtedly 
right to tread with caution and it may be best to walk away. It is high time for all the stakeholders to be 
aware of the possible risk factors associated with each condition of fraud triangle and common 
accounting warning signs otherwise management may have the opportunity to exercise their 
discretionary power to achieve their desired goals.    
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Findings of this study warrant further investigation on decomposition of discretionary components of 
accruals for each of the listed companies in DSE.  
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 Accruals Data 
SN TA AA/NDA CA/DA AVDA/AVCA 
1 -0.08064 -0.43823 0.35759 0.35759 
2 -0.06167 -0.63757 0.5759 0.5759 
3 -0.08714 -0.54974 0.46261 0.46261 
4 0.12136 -0.44044 0.5618 0.5618 
5 -0.02729 -0.29067 0.26338 0.26338 
6 -0.07211 -0.62908 0.55697 0.55697 
7 -0.03805 -0.54223 0.50417 0.50417 
8 -0.06092 -0.45033 0.38941 0.38941 
9 -0.00518 -0.22245 0.21727 0.21727 
10 0.05904 -0.09688 0.15592 0.15592 
11 0.16143 0.11607 0.04537 0.04537 
12 -0.17659 0.00203 -0.17862 0.17862 
13 0.18291 -0.18828 0.37119 0.37119 
14 -0.07475 -0.21653 0.14179 0.14179 
15 0.0049 -0.2444 0.2493 0.2493 
16 -0.16673 -0.30526 0.13853 0.13853 
17 -0.00043 -0.37041 0.36998 0.36998 
18 0.00496 -0.41305 0.41801 0.41801 
19 0.0071 -0.57176 0.57887 0.57887 
20 0.29875 -0.42375 0.7225 0.7225 
21 0.45121 -0.01746 0.46866 0.46866 
22 0.07178 -0.0875 0.15928 0.15928 
23 0.07282 -0.22029 0.29311 0.29311 
24 0.22967 -0.1882 0.41788 0.41788 
25 0.12005 -0.30653 0.42658 0.42658 
26 0.10662 -0.3451 0.45172 0.45172 
27 0.02157 -0.16724 0.18881 0.18881 
28 -0.00651 -0.17183 0.16532 0.16532 
29 0.04671 -0.34473 0.39144 0.39144 
30 -0.04777 -0.13801 0.09024 0.09024 
31 -0.19318 -0.37667 0.18349 0.18349 
32 -0.07499 -0.17008 0.09509 0.09509 
33 0.18148 -0.0916 0.27309 0.27309 
34 -0.01703 -0.24259 0.22556 0.22556 
35 -0.06439 -0.17536 0.11097 0.11097 
36 -0.25379 -0.00165 -0.25214 0.25214 
37 -0.12077 -0.50041 0.37964 0.37964 
38 -0.18739 -0.18977 0.00238 0.00238 
39 -0.00256 0.00186 -0.00442 0.00442 
40 -0.02766 -0.10096 0.0733 0.0733 
41 0.0345 -0.42143 0.45593 0.45593 
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42 -0.04145 -0.30466 0.2632 0.2632 
43 -0.0383 0.01452 -0.05282 0.05282 
44 -0.07612 -0.26903 0.19291 0.19291 
45 -0.01012 -0.73848 0.72836 0.72836 
46 0.00841 -0.53088 0.53929 0.53929 
47 0.06156 -0.13116 0.19272 0.19272 
48 0.15144 -0.22206 0.3735 0.3735 
49 0.12052 -0.13384 0.25437 0.25437 
50 0.18174 0.04463 0.13711 0.13711 
51 -0.12495 -0.16388 0.03894 0.03894 
52 0.08328 -0.06109 0.14437 0.14437 
53 0.01563 -0.15454 0.17017 0.17017 
54 -0.00949 -1.03011 1.02062 1.02062 
55 0.04107 -0.40622 0.44729 0.44729 
56 -0.07635 -0.30497 0.22862 0.22862 
57 -0.1331 -4.2679 4.13481 4.13481 
58 -0.30365 -0.45877 0.15512 0.15512 
59 0.15061 -0.20053 0.35114 0.35114 
60 0.01731 -0.43674 0.45405 0.45405 
61 0.05287 0.4179 -0.36503 0.36503 
62 0.14023 -0.68649 0.82672 0.82672 
63 0.04621 -0.19307 0.23928 0.23928 
64 -0.01182 -0.3927 0.38088 0.38088 
65 -0.08275 -0.48604 0.40329 0.40329 
66 -0.00017 -0.31841 0.31823 0.31823 
67 0.02171 -0.32888 0.35059 0.35059 
68 0.08459 -0.23341 0.318 0.318 
Avaerage      35% 37% 
              *TA = Total Accruals, NDA= Non-Discretionary Accruals, DA= Discretionary Accruals, ABDA= Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals 
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 Negative Accruals Data 
SN Negative Total Accruals SN Positive Total Accruals 
1 -0.08064 1 0.121359 
2 -0.06167 2 0.059037 
3 -0.08714 3 0.161435 
4 -0.02729 4 0.18291 
5 -0.07211 5 0.004904 
6 -0.03805 6 0.004963 
7 -0.06092 7 0.007101 
8 -0.00518 8 0.298749 
9 -0.17659 9 0.451208 
10 -0.07475 10 0.071779 
11 -0.16673 11 0.072824 
12 -0.00043 12 0.229672 
13 -0.00651 13 0.120054 
14 -0.04777 14 0.106615 
15 -0.19318 15 0.021572 
16 -0.07499 16 0.046713 
17 -0.01703 17 0.181483 
18 -0.06439 18 0.034497 
19 -0.25379 19 0.008413 
20 -0.12077 20 0.061562 
21 -0.18739 21 0.151444 
22 -0.00256 22 0.120523 
23 -0.02766 23 0.181742 
24 -0.04145 24 0.083278 
25 -0.0383 25 0.015629 
26 -0.07612 26 0.041067 
27 -0.01012 27 0.150608 
28 -0.12495 28 0.017309 
29 -0.00949 29 0.052873 
30 -0.07635 30 0.140232 
31 -0.1331 31 0.046212 
32 -0.30365 32 0.021709 
33 -0.01182 33 0.084585 
34 -0.08275 
35 -0.00017 
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Faster Growth in Accounts Receivables  
SL 
No 
Sales CY Sales LY ∆ Revenue Growth A/R CY A/R LY  ∆ A/R Growth 
1 409222369 378791393 30430976 8% 86154875 117310024 -31155149 -27% 
2 208899878 193256165 15643713 8% 5318815 4004301 1314514 33% 
3 59470831 30239404 29231427 97% 2624589 2952108 -327519 -11% 
4 158314383 180527578 -22213195 -12% 148501911 81573209 66928702 82% 
5 974979892 888159807 86820085 10% 302293636 332055981 -29762345 -9% 
6 93104303 98711998 -5607695 -6% 8644720 16665270 -8020550 -48% 
7 346865382 192845764 154019618 80% 1317531 5147410 -3829879 -74% 
8 238862215 221571751 17290464 8% 45190258 69521673 -24331415 -35% 
9 64692631 66194674 -1502043 -2% 3324122 3017470 306652 10% 
10 1427769789 620956330 806813459 130% 487570913 120948692 366622221 303% 
11 5805912325 5020795305 785117020 16% 18104898 86453752 -68348854 -79% 
12 1014599816 773598085 241001731 31% 9221258488 9806477599 -585219111 -6% 
13 9499256667 6931516622 2567740045 37% 953496096 881553360 71942736 8% 
14 220466600 273719984 -53253384 -19% 9549893 32492525 -22942632 -71% 
15 59315592 63061238 -3745646 -6% 6272400 4962700 1309700 26% 
16 9714017016 7945762818 1768254198 22% 893573574 1185346485 -291772911 -25% 
17 457763769 434418786 23344983 5% 158280622 107276877 51003745 48% 
18 351429516 379294228 -27864712 -7% 35968890 32540145 3428745 11% 
19 865921216 824257200 41664016 5% 382657712 312639332 70018380 22% 
20 2880611405 2085432500 795178905 38% 857055084 470824787 386230297 82% 
21 31234710327 22007682247 9227028080 42% 3438356670 846869584 2591487086 306% 
22 450135177 369254488 80880689 22% 457164376 327785317 129379059 39% 
23 2409785749 1028992604 1380793145 134% 380378450 160094731 220283719 138% 
24 4022271063 3127352627 894918436 29% 343047480 316068872 26978608 9% 
25 709168568 539554916 169613652 31% 100067414 59343138 40724276 69% 
26 97588294 68738716 28849578 42% 37793156 26897045 10896111 41% 
27 1850615137 1491770828 358844309 24% 5980378 5773092 207286 4% 
28 27065415 20467307 6598108 32% 24713114 22790996 1922118 8% 
29 792299845 706331972 85967873 12% 193153145 176829323 16323822 9% 
30 1391712665 1368041514 23671151 2% 21635567 15283483 6352084 42% 
31 89006700775 74724497824 14282202951 19% 5350043235 5237659409 112383826 2% 
32 12475609225 10989191414 1486417811 14% 2703257156 2375140475 328116681 14% 
33 68551233852 64557072881 3994160971 6% 15253503781 14110569127 1142934654 8% 
34 13471424469 11462578410 2008846059 18% 772421345 508249174 264172171 52% 
35 271506761 268488269 3018492 1% 46380934 44592065 1788869 4% 
36 1525430000 1347312000 178118000 13% 1560461000 979377000 581084000 59% 
37 98002412 84587474 13414938 16% 40939924 41092839 -152915 0% 
38 23268861000 20946040000 2322821000 11% 926842000 488053000 438789000 90% 
39 2234047200 1595086400 638960800 40% 0 13109600 -13109600 -100% 
40 6647846013 5663090394 984755619 17% 190610122 132014023 58596099 44% 
41 573719257 767892320 -194173063 -25% 19109686 27388344 -8278658 -30% 
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42 402855276 419612074 -16756798 -4% 104693679 119115984 -14422305 -12% 
43 1139423635 720827428 418596207 58% 429163986 436201003 -7037017 -2% 
44 881494445 729333960 152160485 21% 118081196 62165497 55915699 90% 
45 1152265740 935094525 217171215 23% 28334623 25135080 3199543 13% 
46 468240190 434207010 34033180 8% 7865104 26222248 -18357144 -70% 
47 681573793 622571342 59002451 9% 290908139 236000082 54908057 23% 
48 1088085260 633983507 454101753 72% 577029624 272546947 304482677 112% 
49 6017281699 3898046048 2119235651 54% 442592334 177520128 265072206 149% 
50 1768097695 1347603761 420493934 31% 1037198898 457541474 579657424 127% 
51 5247748947 4445402112 802346835 18% 2008696513 1666731087 341965426 21% 
52 5461234639 4829017641 632216998 13% 740479176 542510111 197969065 36% 
53 2443657886 1924403783 519254103 27% 546036962 577768167 -31731205 -5% 
54 1947342997 1506444690 440898307 29% 138484116 415221300 -276737184 -67% 
55 570302654 383956707 186345947 49% 62568728 90176034 -27607306 -31% 
56 1814459565 1241049945 573409620 46% 523184050 400180750 123003300 31% 
57 1316345576 1205155338 111190238 9% 55696134 41282366 14413768 35% 
58 2231013380 1586094474 644918906 41% 220273158 235362912 -15089754 -6% 
59 1744462051 1522562141 221899910 15% 972482363 1027773365 -55291002 -5% 
60 3509105802 1978824374 1530281428 77% 777543982 629187317 148356665 24% 
61 876725792 656836533 219889259 33% 19594956 19585582 9374 0% 
62 172717375 126138066 46579309 37% 53819343 34362074 19457269 57% 
63 275209157 229875624 45333533 20% 24448300 10144604 14303696 141% 
64 1780954287 1114948678 666005609 60% 76224568 65045991 11178577 17% 
65 210283278 172586011 37697267 22% 0 0 0 0% 
66 734972610 554265199 180707411 33% 110776095 68041157 42734938 63% 
67 596355557 541672423 54683134 10% 60474635 58222456 2252179 4% 
68 442640850 166412261 276228589 166% 54446444 33097645 21348799 65% 
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Inconsistent Growth in Inventory  
SL 
No 
Sales CY Sales LY ∆ Revenue Growth Inventory CY Inventory LY ∆ Inventory Growth 
1 409222369 378791393 30430976 8% 46923572 35845349 11078223 31% 
2 208899878 193256165 15643713 8% 8426124 7089406 1336718 19% 
3 59470831 30239404 29231427 97% 11952326 11826266 126060 1% 
4 158314383 180527578 -22213195 -12% 4512329 3321090 1191239 36% 
5 974979892 888159807 86820085 10% 317376043 313815439 3560604 1% 
6 93104303 98711998 -5607695 -6% 23189309 12461762 10727547 86% 
7 346865382 192845764 154019618 80% 143522819 131175686 12347133 9% 
8 238862215 221571751 17290464 8% 72618415 62840545 9777870 16% 
9 64692631 66194674 -1502043 -2% 9347000 10152000 -805000 -8% 
10 1427769789 620956330 806813459 130% 263226755 193502758 69723997 36% 
11 5805912325 5020795305 785117020 16% 646758251 534237582 112520669 21% 
12 1014599816 773598085 241001731 31% 4746305762 5223057730 -476751968 -9% 
13 9499256667 6931516622 2567740045 37% 2828333227 2239199979 589133248 26% 
14 220466600 273719984 -53253384 -19% 134880791 118560778 16320013 14% 
15 59315592 63061238 -3745646 -6% 40165720 36377090 3788630 10% 
16 9714017016 7945762818 1768254198 22% 1040056908 814059612 225997296 28% 
17 457763769 434418786 23344983 5% 34268049 20207289 14060760 70% 
18 351429516 379294228 -27864712 -7% 75681214 74711893 969321 1% 
19 865921216 824257200 41664016 5% 408931379 347461213 61470166 18% 
20 2880611405 2085432500 795178905 38% 850885939 450055441 400830498 89% 
21 31234710327 22007682247 9227028080 42% 6452929268 3649002576 2803926692 77% 
22 450135177 369254488 80880689 22% 459900004 417199584 42700420 10% 
23 2409785749 1028992604 1380793145 134% 807801205 240085542 567715663 236% 
24 4022271063 3127352627 894918436 29% 587645695 352650104 234995591 67% 
25 709168568 539554916 169613652 31% 100367939 63978805 36389134 57% 
26 97588294 68738716 28849578 42% 7639356 6955268 684088 10% 
27 1850615137 1491770828 358844309 24% 719482437 680748217 38734220 6% 
28 27065415 20467307 6598108 32% 172806531 175495791 -2689260 -2% 
29 792299845 706331972 85967873 12% 314515290 295080069 19435221 7% 
30 1391712665 1368041514 23671151 2% 349148687 347471297 1677390 0% 
31 89006700775 74724497824 14282202951 19% 331379759 834355326 -502975567 -60% 
32 12475609225 10989191414 1486417811 14% 4026231885 4671791624 -645559739 -14% 
33 68551233852 64557072881 3994160971 6% 1815003716 1819262670 -4258954 0% 
34 13471424469 11462578410 2008846059 18% 2541688329 2207078082 334610247 15% 
35 271506761 268488269 3018492 1% 120593022 117206304 3386718 3% 
36 1525430000 1347312000 178118000 13% 8651382000 7360493000 1290889000 18% 
37 98002412 84587474 13414938 16% 19181562 17103892 2077670 12% 
38 23268861000 20946040000 2322821000 11% 5373033000 4366664000 1006369000 23% 
39 2234047200 1595086400 638960800 40% 12283726500 12039800600 243925900 2% 
40 6647846013 5663090394 984755619 17% 1756397259 1701382223 55015036 3% 
41 573719257 767892320 -194173063 -25% 168634337 155881884 12752453 8% 
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42 402855276 419612074 -16756798 -4% 148820065 131731339 17088726 13% 
43 1139423635 720827428 418596207 58% 5732912051 5763969084 -31057033 -1% 
44 881494445 729333960 152160485 21% 319001200 268575640 50425560 19% 
45 1152265740 935094525 217171215 23% 256192433 221552993 34639440 16% 
46 468240190 434207010 34033180 8% 135692738 95299788 40392950 42% 
47 681573793 622571342 59002451 9% 196460713 128611091 67849622 53% 
48 1088085260 633983507 454101753 72% 437246882 460477009 -23230127 -5% 
49 6017281699 3898046048 2119235651 54% 1932418996 1039932035 892486961 86% 
50 1768097695 1347603761 420493934 31% 566800853 551866626 14934227 3% 
51 5247748947 4445402112 802346835 18% 1236014474 1623278528 -387264054 -24% 
52 5461234639 4829017641 632216998 13% 1392109377 1009211317 382898060 38% 
53 2443657886 1924403783 519254103 27% 704746537 699819589 4926948 1% 
54 1947342997 1506444690 440898307 29% 596728610 511555137 85173473 17% 
55 570302654 383956707 186345947 49% 284599985 172626204 111973781 65% 
56 1814459565 1241049945 573409620 46% 78500199 110913971 -32413772 -29% 
57 1316345576 1205155338 111190238 9% 514774187 491757780 23016407 5% 
58 2231013380 1586094474 644918906 41% 263164972 150077244 113087728 75% 
59 1744462051 1522562141 221899910 15% 1286872443 779176551 507695892 65% 
60 3509105802 1978824374 1530281428 77% 1932774214 844148180 1088626034 129% 
61 876725792 656836533 219889259 33% 280656746 197565052 83091694 42% 
62 172717375 126138066 46579309 37% 19781631 13631338 6150293 45% 
63 275209157 229875624 45333533 20% 58058489 36577632 21480857 59% 
64 1780954287 1114948678 666005609 60% 121892636 5924845 115967791 1957% 
65 210283278 172586011 37697267 22% 75543574 92214272 -16670698 -18% 
66 734972610 554265199 180707411 33% 886225292 667168268 219057024 33% 
67 596355557 541672423 54683134 10% 113774226 87700510 26073716 30% 
68 442640850 166412261 276228589 166% 144744695 81632221 63112474 77% 
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 Risk factors related to incentives or pressures 
1 Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity 
operating conditions, such as high degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins. 
2 Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or 
expectations of third parties, such as need to obtain additional debt or equity 
financing to stay competitive.   
3 Information available indicates that management or board of directors’ personal 
financial situation is threatened by the entity’s financial performance, such as 
significant portion of their compensation being contingent upon achieving 
aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash 
flow.   
4 There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet 
financial targets set up by the board of directors or management, including sales 
or profitability incentives goals. 
Source: AICPA, SAS No.99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, October 2002 
 
Risk factors related to opportunities 
1 The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting, such as assets, liabilities, revenues, or 
expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective judgments or 
uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.  
2 There is ineffective monitoring of management, such as domination of 
management by a single person or small group without compensating controls. 
3 There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, such as overly complex 
organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of 
authority. 
4 Internal control components are deficient, such as inadequate monitoring of 
controls, including automated controls and controls over interim financial 
reporting (when external reporting is required).   
Source: AICPA, SAS No.99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, October 2002 
 
Risk factors related to attitudes / rationalizations 
1 Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcements of the 
entity’s values or ethical standards by management or the communication of 
inappropriate values or ethical standards. 
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2 Non-financial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the 
selection of accounting principles ot the determination of significant estimates.  
3 Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations or 
claims against the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud 
or violations of laws and regulations.   
4 Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock 
price or earnings trend.  
5 
A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third 
parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.  
6 Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis.  
7 
An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize 
reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons 
8 
Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal oe inappropriate 
accounting on the basis of materiality. 
9 
The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is 
strained, such as frequent disputes with current or predecessor auditor on 
accounting, auditing, or reporting matters 
Source: AICPA, SAS No.99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, October 2002 
  
 
Common Accounting Warning Signs 
1 Aggressive revenue recognition 
2 Operating cash flow out of line with reported earnings 
3 Growth in revenues out of sync with economy, industry, or peer companies and 
with growth in receivables. 
4 Growth in inventory out of line with sales growth or days inventory increasing 
over time. 
5 Classification of non-operating or non-recurring income as revenue.  
6 Deferral of expenses 
7 Excessive use of operating leases by lessees. 
8 Classification of expenses or losses as extraordinary or non-recurring. 
9 LIFO liquidations 
10 Gross margins or operating margins out of line with peer companies. 
11 Use of long useful lives for depreciation and amortization. 
12 Use of aggressive pension plan assumptions. 
13 Common use of fourth-quarter surprises. 
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14 
Equity method of accounting / frequent use of off-balance sheet SPEs or variable-
interest entities. 
15 Other off-balance sheet financing or guarantees. 
Source: Financial Reporting and Analysis, CFA Institute, Level 1, Reading 33, 2011 
 
 
